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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 09 BANGKOK 007030

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DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, EAP/RSP  
PACOM FOR FPA FALLON AND J-5  
OSD/ISA FOR POWERS AND STERN  
JCS FOR GARLAND  
NSC FOR MORROW

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SUBJECT: U.S.-THAI STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On November 7 and 8, following up on the President's and Prime Minister Thaksin's commitment, senior U.S. officials met with Thai counterparts to inaugurate a bilateral dialogue on strategic and security issues. The U.S. side was lead by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Eric John and included representatives from OSD, JCS and PACOM. The Thai delegation was led by MFA Permanent Secretary Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn, and included

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representatives from Royal Thai Supreme Command, MOD, the National Intelligence Agency and the military services. Participants discussed a range of bilateral and regional issues including China and India's roles in the region, regional groupings, promoting democracy in Burma, the Korean peninsula, Indonesia, Avian Influenza, trafficking in persons, maritime security, educational exchanges, mil-mil cooperation and exercises, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the continuing unrest in Thailand's far South. The two sides agreed to:

- ¶1. Work through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and US Embassy on a draft Plan of Action;
- ¶2. Explore improving International Law Enforcement Agency (ILEA) efforts to combat trafficking in persons;
- ¶3. Work to strengthen the Fulbright Program and other educational exchanges;
- ¶4. Collaborate on best approaches to upgrade facilities at Utapao Naval Air Base;
- ¶5. Improve maritime observation/intelligence capabilities in the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand;
- ¶6. Assist Thailand answer concerns about the Defense Resource Management Studies (DRMS) and an MOA on procurement;
- ¶7. Proceed together on Global Peacekeeping Operation Initiative (GPOI);
- ¶8. Establish regularized exchanges of views on Burma, led by the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

END SUMMARY.

PROPOSED PLAN OF ACTION

¶2. (C) Krit noted that the Strategic Dialogue had been endorsed by the President and Prime Minister Thaksin during their September 19 meeting in Washington and reflected the strength and depth of U.S.-Thai relations. He expected the Dialogue to build on other recent events which have served to strengthen the relationship including Thailand's designation as a Major Non-NATO Ally in 2003 and the close cooperation following the December 2004 Asian tsunami. He proposed that the two sides use the Dialogue to begin work on a joint Plan of Action that would outline broad goals toward strengthening the relationship and improving people-to-people ties between our two countries, as the PM and the President had agreed in their joint statement following their September 19 meeting. The Thais presented a draft "Plan of Action" for U.S. consideration and suggested that both sides work through diplomatic channels to conclude a joint document by February 2006. DAS John said the U.S. side would need more time to look at the Plan of Action in detail and suggested that a less structured format be considered. Both sides agreed that Embassy Bangkok and the MFA would continue to consider the document.

THE ROLE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN THE REGION

¶3. (C) Krit noted that Southeast Asia was experiencing a period of dynamic change in part to the rising influence of China and India in the region. While emphasizing the "vital" role of the U.S. in the region -- and Thailand's desire to intensify U.S. engagement -- he indicated that Thailand would also focus on developing stronger relations with both China and India. Bangkok viewed both countries as sources of "unlimited consumer demand" and noted they hoped to conclude FTAs with both China and India. Krit hinted that Thailand

could play a "bridging role" between the U.S. and China and India.

14. (C) Echoing comments prevalent among Thai academics, Krit said that overall China's rise should benefit the region, however, there remained several areas of concern, including the Taiwan Straits and relations with Japan. He emphasized the Thai view that China's rise is "inevitable," which required that they had no choice but to engage Beijing. Thailand would "seize the opportunity" of the 30th anniversary of bilateral Sino-Thai relations to enter into a "strategic partnership" with China. Beijing and Bangkok were meeting with increasing frequency through such fora as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Plus Three, and shortly the East Asia Summit (EAS). BGen John Allen of OSD/ISA provided a briefing on Secretary Rumsfeld's recent visit to Beijing, emphasizing the need for greater transparency within the PLA. DAS John noted that the rise of China was not a zero sum game and could benefit both the U.S. and Thailand. John suggested the U.S. and Thailand explore concrete steps to engage China, including joint peacekeeping training, counternarcotics work and counterterrorism cooperation.

15. (C) Turning to India, Krit emphasized the growing influence of India in Southeast Asia and New Delhi's increasing engagement with countries in the region. Describing India's deepening relations with ASEAN countries as a policy of "looking west," he said New Delhi was building stronger bilateral and security ties through regional fora, most notably the ARF. Royal Thai Naval officials and General Kemarat Kanchanawat, Director General of Joint Operations at the Royal Thai Supreme Command, outlined a number of mil-mil operations between India and Thailand in the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal. DAS John suggested that the U.S. and Thailand work closely together to engage India, particularly in the Andaman Sea.

#### REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE -- THE EAS AND ACD

16. (C) Krit suggested that the East Asia Summit (EAS) was moving away from its original concept, which envisioned it as an "East Asia Community," turning more into a forum to exchange views on major issues. Many details needed to be worked out before the EAS would be able to address substantive issues and not "just be a talk shop." Krit noted that the Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), which PM Thaksin has called "the missing link" in Asia's regional architecture, was continuing to expand into a true "pan-Asian" forum. The ACD currently has 28 members, including most recently Saudi Arabia and Russia. Bangkok hoped the ACD would evolve into an informal setting for discussions following the APEC model.

#### INDONESIA

17. (C) Both sides agreed on the many positive recent developments in Indonesia, including progress on democracy and Aceh. DAS John emphasized that the U.S. would continue to support progress on democracy and economic development while expanding military and counterterrorism cooperation. Krit said that Thailand was looking for Indonesia to resume its leadership role within ASEAN and noted that cooperation between Thai and Indonesian intelligence on CT issues had been especially good. The image of the U.S. in Indonesia had improved dramatically following the tsunami, which was one of the most significant -- and positive -- recent developments in the region. Both sides agreed to continue close consultations through Embassy Bangkok on further support for Indonesia policy.

#### DEMOCRATIZATION AND BURMA

18. (C) Ambassador Boyce expressed the USG's concern about the worsening situation in Burma. It was important to recognize that the situation in Burma continued to deteriorate. Aung San Suu Kyi and other key democratic leaders remain in detention, the sham of the National Convention continues, and the dire human rights situation continues to support the flow of refugees, AIDS, and narcotics. The sudden and "inexplicable move" of the capital 250 miles north to Pyinmana had baffled the diplomatic corps. The Ambassador expressed his concern that Thailand was often perceived as an apologist for Rangoon. He further noted that in conversations with the President, Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, Thai officials had promised to take a

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more publicly critical stance if Burma made no progress towards meaningful reform. As Burma continued to show no sign that they are willing to engage with the opposition or make any other concessions, the Ambassador said that the time had come for Thailand to take a stronger stance.

19. (C) Krit stated that he had "no quibbles" with the Ambassador's assessment. It was "very true" that the U.S. and Thailand shared common concerns about the situation in Burma, and the joint statement between President Bush and PM Thaksin was a testament to the "unanimity of views" between the two countries. Krit admitted that Rangoon was becoming more difficult to talk to, that the economic situation was worsening and that there were increasingly visible strains between the government and minority ethnic groups. However, he explained, Thailand continued to believe in a policy of constructive engagement. General Kemarat noted that the RTG was well aware of the danger of the collapse of the Burmese regime, and had plans in place in case it happened. Both delegations agreed that, in response to the joint statement issued by the President and PM Thaksin, we would have more regularized exchanges of views on Burma.

#### THE KOREAN PENINSULA

10. (C) Both sides discussed recent developments on the Korean Peninsula. DAS John provided a brief readout on the current status of Six Party Talks and the challenges ahead as the U.S. and other participants pursue the goal of a nuclear free Korean Peninsula. Krit said that Thailand remained particularly interested in the Six Party Talks, noting Foreign Minister Kantathi's recent visit to Pyongyang. The Thais -- as they have in past meetings with senior USG officials -- suggested that Thailand could play a mediating role between the DPRK and the U.S.

#### AVIAN INFLUENZA

11. (SBU) Noting they were a "front line country," the Thais emphasized the seriousness with which they were approaching Avian Influenza (AI). Krit described plans to monitor possible outbreaks of the diseases within Thailand and RTG efforts to work closely with other ASEAN members and the WHO on AI. Thai Ministry of Public Health officials noted that on November 3 the Prime Ministers of Cambodia, Burma, Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand met in Bangkok to develop a common approach to combating AI and related diseases. (NOTE: The leaders met under the auspices of the "Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS). END NOTE) Krit said that Thailand hoped to become an anti-viral production center in the future, and asked for U.S. technical assistance on stockpiling anti-viral drugs.

12. (SBU) DAS John emphasized the seriousness with which the U.S. government was approaching AI, noting that it is a global challenge. John commended Thai efforts thus far and requested that the RTG expand its cooperation on monitoring with neighboring countries, particular Burma. John said the U.S. would seek collaboration with Thailand for future vaccine trials.

#### TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

13. (SBU) Both sides briefly discussed Trafficking in Persons (TIP). DAS John commended Thailand for progress on TIP issues, but suggested that even stronger legislation was required to provide greater legal protection for victims related to labor trafficking. The two sides agreed to explore ways to improve ILEA's anti-TIP programs.

#### EDUCATION EXCHANGES

14. (U) The Thais emphasized the importance they placed on the long-standing educational exchanges between the U.S. and Thailand, and their hope that these exchanges be expanded. Thai Ministry of Education officials said they would particularly like to expand the Fulbright Program and the Peace Corps presence, improve English language instruction, develop greater links between universities, and expand teacher education in science and technology. Additionally, the Thai military hopes for greater military training opportunities and would like to increase the number of Thai cadets at U.S. military academies. DAS John said that Embassy Bangkok would continue to look for ways to expand and support educational cooperation. He strongly advocated that the RTG correct the funding disparity of the Thai Fulbright Program -- currently funded almost entirely by the U.S. -- by matching the U.S. contribution.

#### UTAPAO UPGRADES

15. (C) General Allen noted that the quick decision by the RTG to allow the U.S. to use Utapao as a regional hub for tsunami relief operations was a prime example of how

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increased military access could benefit the region --

furthering our joint interests. The USG remained sensitive to the fact that the RTG would prefer the extent of U.S. access to Utapao remain relatively quiet. Focusing on the continued strategic importance of Utapao, Allen explained that the USG wished to maintain access to the base and was ready to work with Thailand to upgrade existing facilities. Rear Admiral Narongpol Na Bangchang of the Royal Thai Navy noted that land at Utapao is limited and any plans to upgrade base facilities should be done with Cobra Gold operations in mind. He further noted that a full upgrade of Utapao would cost approximately 17 million dollars. The Thai side also explained that it hoped to build a UN Emergency Logistics Response Facility near Utapao to improve capabilities to respond to future emergencies, and sought U.S. support for this designation. Allen explained that PACOM components had examined Utapao with an eye towards potential improvement. These findings were being consolidated now and PACOM would share them with the Thai in the near future.

#### MARITIME SECURITY

16. (C) Both sides acknowledged that maritime security was an issue of enormous importance. Royal Thai Navy representatives noted that the RTG cooperated with many countries in the region to monitor maritime traffic in the Andaman Sea and the South China Sea, including joint maritime patrols with Vietnam and Malaysia. General Kemarat described shortcomings in the "Eyes in the Sky" (EITS) program. Implemented in September, EITS seeks to mobilize the combined resources of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to maintain maritime security in the Strait of Malacca. Kemarat explained that, in practice, EITS is of limited utility because it only involves token patrol flights by one plane each from Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Kemarat was much more hopeful of an Indonesian proposal to set up ship patrols coupled with reporting stations in the region to be part of a "Combined Maritime Patrol" architecture. This architecture would be multi-national and interagency -- running in parallel with EITS -- and would divide the Strait into five reporting zones, with reporting stations in Phuket (Thailand), Lumut and Sabang (Indonesia), Dumai (Malaysia) and Changi (Singapore). Although, there would be no single command and control center, each country would receive a full activity report from all sectors. Kemarat explained that this project was currently in the "working-group" stage and the Thai side did not know when it would be fully implemented. Kemarat suggested, however, that the Phuket node of such an architecture could provide tactical feed from all of the stations into a Thai-U.S Maritime Operations Intelligence Fusion capability, now in the planning stages. The two sides agreed to work more closely to improve our joint ability to monitor ship traffic in the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand. Kemarat indicated his willingness to work with JUSMAGTHAI to endorse a statement of intent with JIATF-West to set up a Maritime Fusion capability.

#### DEFENSE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT STUDIES

17. (SBU) Noting that in previous weeks the USG had briefed the Thai on Defense Resource Management Studies (DRMS), General Allen asked whether Thailand was ready to begin implementation of the program. PermSec Krit and LTG Naraset Israngkura, Deputy Director General of MOD's Office of Policy and Planning, asked for more time to study the proposal. Privately, Naraset seemed frustrated at MFA's unwillingness to commit to the initial assessment phase of the DRMS. General Allen suggested that the Thais visit the Philippines to view the results of a particularly successful DRMS program. Dennis Lawrence of the Institute for Defense Analysis reiterated that DRMS came with no strings attached, emphasizing that once the assessment was completed the Thai could decide whether they wished to proceed with the program. Failing to win a commitment to endorse DRMS, the U.S. side promised to work to answer any remaining concerns in the hopes that Thailand will be able to participate in DRMS in 2006.

#### NATIONAL TRAINING FACILITY AND GPOI

18. (C) General Kemarat gave a detailed briefing outlining Thai plans to build a National Training Facility (NTF) capacity at Lop Buri, Prachuap Kirikhan, and Kanchanaburi. He said that the facility at Lop Buri would include a Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) facility, a joint live fire training range and a PKO/counter-insurgency training area. Kemarat explained that the NTF would be used by the three services and Thai police to improve skills and that the facility at Lop Buri would be an integral part of Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) under which concerned countries would work to train 15,000 peace keepers in the Asia-Pacific region. General Allen noted that Thailand was a global leader in United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO) and that the United States welcomed the

establishment of the NTF, which was consistent with the aims of GPOI. Allen did, however, caution that the Thai side should seek to centralize as much as possible the final NTF site. Both Krit and Kemarat confirmed that Thailand fully endorses GPOI and stands ready to work with the United States to make it a success.

#### COBRA GOLD AND COPE TIGER

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119. (C) Air Vice Marshal Ittaphorn Subhawong, Director of Operations for the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF), noted with concern that there were plans to combine the annual Cobra Gold exercise with Cope Tiger. The RTAF views Cope Tiger as instrumental in improving Thai air capabilities and that it was important to maintain Cope Tiger as a separate entity not focused on PKO like Cobra Gold. General Allen cautioned no final decision about consolidating the two exercises had been made and promised to relay the RTAF concerns to the appropriate authorities. Brig. Gen. David Snyder, PACOM Deputy J-5, explained that U.S. strategic lift remained a serious concern and that the United States was looking for ways to better use this valuable commodity.

120. (C) The Thai delegation endorsed the U.S. proposal to make Cobra Gold 2007 a GPOI Capstone event. General Kemarat also promised that Thailand would send a platoon to Khaan Quest 2006 in Mongolia, also a GPOI Capstone event, to study ways to make Cobra Gold 2007 and GPOI in Thailand a success. General Allen asked Thailand to continue to think of creative ways to use Cobra Gold and our bilateral exercise program as a way to enhance regional cooperation with key countries such as Japan, Indonesia and Australia. On the margins of the meeting, several Thai officials indicated a willingness to work with the Chinese PLA in future GPOI or peacekeeping events.

#### PSI AND NON-PROLIFERATION

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121. (C) DAS John opened the non-proliferation discussion by noting that over sixty countries had endorsed the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), signaling their commitment to halting the spread of WMD. In particular, he noted Philippine President Arroyo's public statement at UNGA this year in support of PSI. Krit responded by noting Thailand's support for U.S. efforts to interdict illegal transfers of WMD, but explained that the RTG was looking for the right time to subscribe to PSI. Thailand would like to announce its support for PSI with another ASEAN country, preferably an Islamic one. In the meantime, RTG officials would appreciate some clarification on issues of Thai concern regarding the initiative. MFA's Kriangsak Kittichaisaree, who will be the DG for International Organizations in 2006, asked for U.S. assistance in answering a series of technical and legal questions about PSI.

122. (C) DAS John responded that, on implementation, regardless of whether Thai law allows specific actions or not, PSI does not obligate participating states to do anything. On potential political concerns, PSI interdiction activities are not publicized and thus pose little potential public downsides. Moreover, the benefits of forward action in halting the spread of WMD should outweigh any potential negative political concerns. DAS John thanked the Thai for their support of the IAEA additional protocol and inquiring whether the RTG had considered supporting the Hague Code of Conduct on Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC).

#### COUNTERTERRORISM AND SOUTHERN THAILAND

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123. (C) Krit noted that Thailand has ratified five of the twelve UN anti-terrorism conventions, and hopes to complete the remaining seven. Although Thai officials had reached out to UN experts to help them draft new laws to ratify the conventions, these drafts had been rejected by different parts of the RTG, slowing the process. On the broader war on terror, Krit emphasized Thailand's willingness to continue cooperation, citing current efforts such as PISCES and CSI. In the region, terrorism must be viewed in the broader political context of rising Islamic extremism, and the increasing influence of conservative political Islam in Indonesian and Malaysia.

124. (C) Turning to the situation in Southern Thailand, Krit reaffirmed that the RTG remains concerned about the potential for external actors such as Al Q'aida and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) to become involved, but as of yet had not seen such activity. The flare-up of violence in the last couple of years was due to domestic factors and driven by three groups: separatists, narco-traffickers, and local politicians, who are using the violence for their own ends. The RTG is worried that casting the violence in Islamic terms only serves to increase the militancy of youth in the South.



125. (C) Given these concerns, the RTG has embarked on a comprehensive, long-term effort to attack the root causes of the violence. Krit claimed the government has been successful in preventing the situation from being portrayed as a Buddhist-Muslim conflict, and to ensure that it is not internationalized. The recent war of words with Malaysia over the 131 Thai who fled their homes to Malaysia was an unfortunate affair, but the two sides are moving beyond this spat to improve their cooperation. Krit expressed some frustration, however, with the role of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) which sent a delegation to the South. In their statement of concern over the treatment of Thai Muslims who have been arrested, OIC representatives missed the point that the nearly 1,000 people who have died in the violence are victims too.

126. (C) Ambassador Boyce responded by reiterating that this was an internal Thai matter, and one that demands a Thai response. That said, the USG remains concerned about the potential for external terrorist involvement in the South. The formulation of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) to examine the causes and potential solutions to violence in the South was to be applauded, and the U.S. looks forward to its final report. The Ambassador noted that improving Thai-Malaysian cooperation is also a welcome step and that geography dictates the necessity of this collaboration. For the RTG this is indeed their southern problem, but for the Malaysians it is their northern problem. Finally, the Ambassador repeated his offer for appropriate types of assistance to the Thai effort, a sentiment echoed by General Allen.

127. (C) General Kemarat presented a brief powerpoint presentation outlining the RTA's plan of action in the South, which emphasizes the use of military, police, and civilian resources to secure peace and order, improve the economy, strengthen local governance, and combat the ideology of extremism. The RTG has considered construction of an electronic fence along the 647 kilometer Thai-Malaysian border, but each kilometer cost nearly 2 million U.S. dollars, leading the RTA to focus on the use of ground sensors to secure the border instead. Thai forces were also making use of an Israeli-manufactured unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in the South (Note: for what purpose remained unclear. End Note.), but needed more UAVs. Finally, the RTA is focused on improving its C4I infrastructure in the South, but this would take time.

128. (C) General Allen stated that the U.S. offer of assistance could be focused by a DRMS and potential opportunities that may become available through transformation initiatives from the Joint Forces Command. He invited those RTA to travel with him to the U.S. Joint Forces Command in Norfolk to see how inter-force cooperation worked. Identifying the specific needs of the Thai forces in the South is the key to determining appropriate U.S. assistance.

#### NEXT STEPS

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129. (C) In closing, the two sides agreed to the following next steps in the dialogue (which should be considered C/Rel Thai).

1. Work through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and US Embassy on a draft Plan of Action;
2. Explore improving International Law Enforcement Agency (ILEA) efforts to combat trafficking in persons;
3. Work to strengthen the Fulbright Program and other educational exchanges;
4. Collaborate on best approaches to upgrade facilities at Utapao Naval Air Base;
5. Improve maritime observation/intelligence capabilities in the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand;
6. Assist Thailand answer concerns about the Defense Resource Management Studies (DRMS) and an MOA on procurement;
7. Proceed together on Global Peacekeeping Operation Initiative (GPOI);
8. Establish regularized exchanges of views on Burma between Embassy Bangkok and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

#### COMMENT

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130. (C) After an almost ten year hiatus, this was the first time we have brought Thai civilian and military officials together with U.S. counterparts to discuss strategic issues. Thai problems with interagency "stovepiping," the MFA's lack of a grasp of military issues, and the corresponding lack of understanding by the Thai military of regional fora and the complexities of Burma policy were obvious. Several officials told us privately that this was the first time they had worked with counterparts from other agencies on these sorts of issues. Despite the often tedious pace of the talks, we believe the enhanced interaction among the Thai and the endorsements we received for GPOI, Utapao upgrades, improved

maritime surveillance and talks on Burma were worth the effort. END COMMENT.

DELEGATION LIST  
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U.S. SIDE:

1. Eric John, Delegation Head, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of State
2. Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, Bangkok
3. BGen. John Allen, Office of the Secretary of Defense
4. Brig. Gen. Jeffrey Remington, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
5. Brig. Gen. David "Tanker" Snyder, Deputy J-5, PACOM
6. Alexander A. Arvizu, DCM Bangkok
7. Col. Steven McKeag, Defense Attach, Bangkok
8. COL Kevin Clark, Chief, JUSMAGTHAI
9. Mark B. Lambert, Political/Military Affairs, Bangkok
10. Jessica Powers, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense
11. Melanie Higgins, Thailand Desk Officer, Department of State
12. Lt. Col. Kyle Garland, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense
13. Lt. Col. Seshagiri Munipalli, FPA, PACOM
14. LTC Timothy Dunne, J-7, PACOM
15. Jane Bocklage, PM/Regional Security and Arms Transfers, Department of State
16. Dennis L. Lawrence, Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA)

RTG SIDE:

1. H.E. Dr. Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn, Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs
  2. Mrs. Nongnuth Petcharatana, Director General, Department of American and South Pacific Affairs
  3. General Kemarat Kanchanawat, Director General, Joint Operations Supreme Command
  4. Lt. General Noraset Israngkura, Deputy Director General, Office of Policy and Planning, Office of the Permanent Secretary of Defense
  5. Major General Surapan Wongthai, Director General of Operations, Directorate of Operations, Royal Thai Army
  6. Major General Padejkarn Jantsawek, Director General, Office of Policy and Planning, Joint Operation, Supreme Command
  7. RADM Bongsak Singnarong, Director General, Joint and Combined Exercises Planning Office, Supreme Command
  8. AVM Ittaphorn Subhawong, Director of Operations, Royal Thai Air Force Headquarters
  9. Colonel Surasit Thanadtang, Director for Policy and Strategy, Joint Operations, Supreme Command
  10. Colonel Jirawat Punsawat, Directorate of Operations, Royal Thai Army
  11. Colonel Thikarnporn Chulilung, Director, Office of Policy and Planning, Office of the Permanent Secretary of Defense
  12. Group Captain Songtam Chokkanapitag, Directorate of Operations, Royal Thai Air Force Headquarters
  13. Mr. Choombhon Lertrattakarn, Senior Specialist in International Relations, National Security Council
  14. Ms. Ratchanee Sornsiri, Office of Foreign Affairs, Narcotics Control Board
  15. Ms. Rarinthip Sirorat, Director of Policy and Strategic Planning, Ministry of Social Development and Human Security
31. (U) DAS John has cleared this message.  
BOYCE